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Abstract 
 
‘Super-wicked’ problems such as climate change require ambitious policies within 
stable policy frameworks. Key for policy stability is to disincentivise future reversals 
to carbon-intensive lifestyles resulting in unstoppable climate change. It requires lock-
in into a low-carbon development trajectory, increasing popular support and needs to 
be self-reinforcing with reversal costs rising over time as benefits increase. In 
parliamentary political systems (e.g. UK), policies emerge more easily but are more 
difficult to maintain given that shifting political majorities can result in policy U-
turns, resulting in uncertainties for investment in low-carbon transitions. We examine 
what factors determine policy stability in UK Climate Change Policy aiming to 
reduce CO2 emissions by 85-90% by 2050. Policy stability depends on favourable 
public opinion and the political system. In the case of parliamentary democracies the 
extent to which it is embedded into a multilevel governance institutional framework 
and political cross-party consensus is particularly important for policy stability. 
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Introduction  
‘Super-wicked’ problems such as climate change require ambitious and stable policies 
(Levin et al., 2012). To address climate change effectively, considerable upfront 
investments into R&D, technology, changes to business models and infrastructure are 
necessary. One key impediment for such investments is policy uncertainty. This 
means that for low carbon investments to be viable and pay off in the long term, 
investment-incentivising policies must remain stable and reliable over their life-span 
and pay-off period of frequently over 20 years, pointing towards a crucial importance 
of stable, predictable government investment (Liang and Fiorino, 2013) and policy 
frameworks. Key areas requiring significant investments are renewable energy 
(Favretto et al., 2015), green urban infrastructure (Smedby and Quitzau, 2016) and 
adaptation (Wamsler, 2016). Sticking to a policy pathway is central for stable 
policies. This increases the confidence of all stakeholders that their behavioural 
changes and investments into corresponding compliance activities will be rewarded 
over the longer term (Koch et al. 2009).  
This analysis contributes to the policy stability literature. It addresses the 
challenge that short-term changes in government may result in derailing concerted, 
democratically legitimated national and global efforts to address cross-border and 
intergenerational challenges such as climate change, environmental degradation and 
ensuring sustainable development. There is an increasing number of examples of 
fading political support for environmental and climate change policies, even among 
lauded ‘leaders’ such as Sweden (Hysing, 2014), and across developed countries, 
especially in the European Union. This is part of an emerging trend of environmental 
‘policy dismantling’, i.e. rolling back the policy advances made in the 1990s and 
2000s in the wake of ongoing economic austerity measures (Gravey and Jordan, 
2016). This poses a direct challenge to the need for stable policies that facilitate 
investment in clean technologies and help implement the Paris Agreement. An 
increasing body of policy literature argues in favour of policy interventions that allow 
effectively addressing climate change and analysing options of achieving this 
objective (e.g. Jordan and Matt, 2014; O’Neill et al., 2013). This is especially 
important in policy areas dealing with ‘super-wicked’ problems such as climate 
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change, which are defined as “time is running out; those who cause the problem also 
seek to provide a solution; the central authority needed to address them is weak or 
non-existent; and irrational discounting occurs that pushes responses into the future” 
(Levin et al., 2012: 124). 
The central claim of this paper is that policy stability can achieve an upward 
virtuous cycle of policies that support and reinforce sustainable development. The 
central research question is: Which framework conditions are relevant to design and 
maintain stable and ambitious policies capable of addressing ‘super-wicked’ problems 
such as climate change? This contribution focuses on the framework conditions that 
enable policy stability, i.e. helping policies to stay in place to address particularly 
difficult long-term problems. The concept of path-dependency as an element of policy 
stability can be used to strengthen policies that address collective action problems of 
public goods (Levin et al., 2012). The central contribution is to address the gap in the 
literature regarding the design of stable policies by illustrating how policy stability 
depends on a favourable public mood, and on the political system. In a presidential 
political system it is difficult for policies to emerge when different parties control the 
legislative and executive (e.g. climate change in the United States if executive orders 
are not taken into account), but it is also more difficult to dismantle them following an 
election, compared to parliamentary systems where the victorious party controls both 
executive and legislative. A key finding of this article is that in the case of 
parliamentary democracies the extent to which public policymaking is embedded into 
a multilevel governance framework and political cross-party consensus are crucial for 
policy stability.  
Following a discussion of these factors, this article proceeds to an empirical 
analysis of UK Climate Change Policy, based on the 2008 UK Climate Change Act. 
This was identified as a most-likely case of a potentially stable climate policy based 
on a review of over 500 climate laws in 66 countries (Nachmany et al. 2014) due to 
its long-term policy design towards 2050 and carbon budgets. The analysis draws on 
data from a 2010 survey of public pereceptions of climate change in the UK. A 
unique probit analysis is conducted of a sub-set of data from this survey, finding that 
levels of concern play a positive and significant role in shaping willingness to take 
public action on climate change amongst individuals, and that climate change beliefs 
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were not a significant driver of voting preferences in UK elections. These findings 
combine to highlight the opportunties to seize upon periods of high levels of concern 
to implement policy, and the ability to build cross-party consensus on the issue. The 
analysis also examines the evolution of concern for climate change in the UK via 
Eurobarometer surveys, illustrating that declines in public concern were not 
associated with dramatic changes in UK climate change policy. The findings 
demonstrate the opportunities and political pitfalls to policy stability and will be 
critically discussed in the fourth section before the fifth section concludes on the 
findings. 
 
 
Conditioning factors for policy stability  
The policy dismantling literature offers a very useful point of departure. It made 
important contributions to the study of environmental policy with its focus on 
intentionally, actor-driven policy change on the EU level (Gravey and Jordan, 2016) 
and policy output in terms of dismantling by default, arena-shifting, symbolic action 
and active dismantling (Bauer et al., 2012). The following section draws attention to 
factors that condition the choices of actors to achieve policy stability. Subsequently, 
policy stability is defined as maintaining the status quo of a policy and strengthening 
it over time as opposed to weakening and/ or dismantling a policy. This points 
towards institutional conditions that can avoid or at least offer a barrier towards 
unintentional policy dismantling, which puts long-term policies, such as on climate 
change, at risk of becoming ‘collateral damage’ in times of economic austerity and 
shifting political attention towards economic and security challenges. The following 
analysis identifies and discusses public opinion and the political system as factors that 
can either support or weaken policy stability. These have been rarely systematically 
examined in the policy change literature, which so far has focused, pre-dominantly, 
on actor’s interests and power constellations between advocacy coalitions, the 
availability of policy solutions looking for a policy problem, the role of policy 
entrepreneurs, windows of opportunity and the impact of external shocks 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier, 1998). Our contribution seeks to 
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illustrate the relevance of public opinion and the political system as conditioning 
factors within major theories of policy change. 
 
Path-dependency 
The concept of path-dependency can be useful to understand and reduce the 
likelihood of policy U-turns following a change in political leadership or short-term 
shocks to the political system in other policy areas. So far, most of the literature on 
socio-technological change and policy analysis focused on negative or unintended 
consequences of policies that, shortly after their development, became very costly to 
reverse with an increasing constituency of beneficiaries, who formed a strong lobby 
against policy reform (Mahzouni 2015). Thus, negative effects of that policy were 
‘locked-in’ to remain in place. The best-known effects of technological lock-in and 
social path-dependencies are the QWERTY-keyboard, the design of the combustion-
engine, the lock-in into a carbon intensive lifestyle based on the built infrastructure 
and behavioural path-dependencies such as consumption habits (Barnes et al., 2004). 
A rich literature developed around the sources, negative effects and barriers to 
overcoming such path-dependencies in technological developments and economic 
transformations (e.g. Berkhout, 2002; Foxon, 2013). It illustrates the pitfalls of path-
dependency and illustrates why path-dependency, i.e. the self-reinforcing character of 
a policy-pathway, is traditionally seen as normatively undesirable feature of policy 
outcomes. This is however only one (albeit dominant) side of the coin.  
This contribution embraces the more recent and less explored constructivist 
perspective that path-dependency is what actors make of it, thus also allowing for 
normatively desirable and stable policies to emerge and to be adapted to unforeseen 
changes within a pathway. This basic assumption adopted from Levin, Cashore, 
Bernstein and Auld (2012) can offer a useful concept to ‘constrain our future selves’ 
to a low-carbon economic development pathway and to avoid future reversals to 
carbon intensive lifestyles that would result in unstoppable and catastrophic changes 
to the earth system. Levin et al. (2012) suggest four preconditions for policies to be 
regarded as path-dependent and thus capable of addressing ‘super-wicked’ problems 
such as climate change: (1) lock-in of the policies via an immediate durability of the 
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policy design, e.g. via institutional rules creating hurdles making it immediately hard 
to reverse the policy, such as constitutional provisions or consensus voting; (2) the 
policy needs to contain self-reinforcing dynamics by increasing the costs of reversing 
the policy over time, such as creating vested interests of actors who expect their 
investments to pay-off in the future and who would be opposed to reversing the 
policy; (3) increasing returns of policy benefits over time and (4) scope for positive 
feedbacks via expanding to other populations and reinforcing the support of the 
original target population. 
There is a downside to lock-in effects if a policy gets locked into a pathway 
that turns out to be highly counterproductive to the initial objective. This includes 
among others changes to the framework conditions, new technological developments 
or new scientific evidence. Policies can fall victim to their initial success based on 
weak ambitions to achieve a high acceptability among key stakeholders such as 
industry. If these industries however make long-term investments based on their 
expectations of continuing weak policy ambitions and lobby policymakers 
accordingly to prevent more ambitious policy reforms, policies can become locked 
into ‘low-ambition’ pathways that turn out to be contrary to their initial motivations of 
effectively addressing climate change. For example, the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) was introduced using a phased approach (Skaerseth and Wettestad, 
2009). To reduce opposition the initial pilot phase between 2005-2007 had weak 
targets and was self-contained. The subsequent two phases have also suffered from 
unambitious targets and low carbon prices, reducing the long-term incentives to invest 
in low-carbon energy generation in Europe. 
Thus, a path-dependent policy also needs to be adaptable via in-built 
flexibility of a policy pathway to allow for adjustments of the policy details while the 
overall policy pathway remains stable. Therefore, we add adaptability within a 
pathway and the possibility to revise a pathway towards higher ambitions (in line with 
the original policy objective) as fifth criterion for policy stability. This is particularly 
important to allow adjustments to the policy details over time as new scientific 
evidence becomes available calling for stronger or allowing weaker policy measures, 
technological advancements making alternative low carbon approaches more 
economically feasible or negative social, economic or environmental consequences of 
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one pathway call for alternative approaches. Such adaptability is one major 
achievement of the 2015 Paris Agreement with its automatic five-yearly review cycle 
of domestic climate policies. This alignment of policy measures with roadmap targets 
provides further tools to readjust policies. The five criteria for policy stability are 
widely applicable to different country contexts and environmental policy related 
fields. However, there are certain conditioning factors that make it more or less likely 
for countries to reduce the chance of reversibility of policy change in support of a 
stable environment for low carbon technology investments. These must be taken into 
account when assessing policy stability based on the five criteria discussed above.  
Broadly, they can be differentiated as institutional and socio-political 
conditioning factors of agency in policymaking. The major agents in democratic 
decisionmaking are political parties, politicians and the electorate, whose activities are 
guided by (country specific) rules, norms, civil society and increasingly social media. 
This points towards the political system and public opinion as major conditioning 
factors for stable policies to emerge and persist.  
 
The political system: multilevel governance and party-political consensus 
Why are some countries successful in designing and maintaining climate policies 
while others experience U-turns? Key examples are Germany’s three U-turns on 
nuclear energy (phase-out, continous use with new government in 2009, phase-out 
due to strong public opposition following the 2011 Fukushima disaster) and the 
reversion of the Australian Carbon Tax and Emission Trading Scheme, which was 
introduced via the Clean Energy Act 2011. Following Tony Abbot’s LNP victory in 
the general election 2013, the Clean Energy legislative package and with it the carbon 
tax and emission trading scheme were repealed in 2014 and replaced by weaker 
climate legislation (Nachmany et al., 2014). At the same time, the US still define most 
of their climate change policy via the 1963 Clean Air Act as well as its 1970 
extension and 1977/1990 amendments (Nachmany et al. 2014: 606). This illustrates 
that in parliamentary systems such as Australia, new policies are quick to emerge, but 
can also be repealed easily. The presidential political system with frequently opposing 
majorities in the House of Representatives and/or US Senate makes it very difficult 
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for policies to emerge, but also difficult to be removed once they are in place (Levin 
et al., 2012). 
These examples indicate that the political system and political voting 
behaviour (Carey and Hix, 2011) are relevant factors for policies to emerge and be 
reversed, i.e. both matter for stability and adaptability. The separation of powers, e.g. 
in a presidential system (Bell 2004) such as the US, or a sharing of powers e.g. in 
parliamentary systems (such as Australia, Germany, UK) as well as the impact of 
proportional voting (Vowles 2004) versus ‘first-past-the-post’ systems (Kedar 2011) 
can influence how easily a policy outcome can be achieved following debates and 
votes in the legislature. This in turn can also determine how easily the next 
government can change policies enacted by the previous government. Yet, where and 
when a countries’ constitution emerged also determines details of the electoral 
system.  
Thus, the design of the political system and its influence on legislative voting 
behaviour plays an important role in widening or limiting policy options in more 
controversial policy environments. An exception would be the existence of a strong 
party-political consensus, which can help to keep windows of opportunity for policy 
change open for a longer period of time. Powerful ‘winning coalitions’ succeed in 
policymaking with their proposals when the positions of relevant actors shift 
gradually towards an equilibrium between the group’s interests (Bernstein and 
Cashore, 2007). The second aspect is how strongly a country is embedded into 
multilevel governance arrangements. These include multilateral agreements such as 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement on the international level and, in the case 
of EU countries, regional-level burden sharing agreements within multilevel 
environmental governance (Balme and Ye 2014; Paavola 2016) and implementation 
of EU climate change policy into national law. This multilevel governance aspect 
requires the implementation of global commitments and limits governments’ ability to 
easily modify (or repeal) existing climate change policies. 
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Public opinion 
Public opinion and the wider ‘national mood’ can extend or limit the options available 
to policymakers. The ‘national mood’ is the public’s awareness of a policy problem 
disseminated via the media. Strong public opinion and concern about a policy issue 
can provide justification and reassurance for politicians to act (Kingdon, 1995). Public 
opinion is thus relevant for elections, re-election and determining public willingness 
to accept for example climate and environmental policies. Furthermore, public 
opinion is not only influenced by government action, it also signals policymakers 
initial and sustained public support for a policy, which is extremely important for 
stable policies that once in place are designed to be ‘sticky’ and difficult to reverse. 
Yet, stable policies also depend on the policy options that were available at a specific 
point in time. These policy options were formed based on the interests of key actors 
and the overall ‘national mood’ communicated to policymakers via the media and 
opinion polls.  
The ‘national mood’ links the available policy options to the key actor’s 
political interests, which are determined by beliefs, values, agendas, party ideology 
and pressure group campaigns. These evolve over time. It is relevant for policymakers 
as it reflects wider societal demands and the thinking of a large number of individuals 
along common lines. It creates an initial openness to ideas among policymakers, 
whose “sense of the national mood serves to promote some items on their policy 
agendas and restrain others from rising to prominence” (Kingdon, 1995: 147). 
External shocks can influence the ‘national mood’ such as the nuclear disaster in 
Fukushima in March 2011 that led to Germany’s exit from using nuclear power, or 
unusually intensive heat waves and hurricanes that are associated with accelerating 
climate change such as Hurricanes Katrina in 2005 and Sandy in 2011. Depending on 
how the media frames these issues, they can impact on public opinion (Brandenburg 
and Van Egmond, 2011), ultimately shifting policy preferences.  
This section discussed the relevance of public opinion and the political system 
as relevant conditioning factors for stable policies capable of effectively addressing 
climate change and other ‘super wicked’ policy problems. It thus addresses a rarely 
explored aspect of central public policy theories concerned with policy change 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier, 1998) by highlighting conditions 
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for policy stability with scope for minor adaptability of policy pathways to take into 
account changing circumstances while still increasing policy actions that address the 
initial ‘super wicked’ policy problem. The following section illustrates the relevance 
of public opinion and the political system for policy stability through the empirical 
example of UK climate change policy between 2006 and 2013 with a focus on the 
2008 Climate Change Act. The section serves two purposes. First, it empirically 
illustrates that public opinion and the policy system do indeed matter for policy 
stability and should thus be taken into account in analyses of policy change and 
stability. Second, it offers insight into the relationship between these two conditioning 
factors and the factors determining policy change highlighted by major policy change 
theories. 
 
 
Methodology  
The UK Climate Change Policy case study draws from the analysis of policy 
documents, the academic literature, media reports and public opinion surveys 
(Pidgeon et al., 2010). The first survey was based on a nationally representative face-
to-face interviews with 1822 responses conducted by Ipsos MORI in 2010 for the 
study “Public perceptions of climate change and energy futures in Britain 2010” 
(Pidgeon et al., 2010) based at the University of Cardiff, funded by the British 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and retrieved via the University of 
Essex UK Data Archive. The year 2010 was an ideal time to conduct such a survey on 
the willingness of the UK public to accept climate change policies. The 2008 Climate 
Change Act was beginning to take effect after climate change emerged as a major 
issue on the political agenda and in the media. Al Gore’s documentary ‘An 
Inconvenient Truth’, the Stern Review on the costs of climate change and the 2009 
Climate Change summit in Copenhagen coincided with high media coverage and 
public awareness of climate change between 2007 and 2010 (Gifford et al. 2016). Yet 
it also captures disappointment at international difficulties and economic challenges 
of the emerging austerity government agenda. This suggests that survey respondents 
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were able to make educated judgements about climate change and had an awareness 
of the pros and cons associated with climate change policy. 
In the first model the independent variable is the categorical question on pub-
lic concern on climate change while the dependent variable, which is also categorical, 
is on the public’s willingness to accept stable, far-reaching climate mitigation policies 
and was measured via the respondent’s likelihood to vote in favour of the government 
spending “taxpayer’s money on British projects designed to tackle climate change” 
coded in the survey as question Q38_4 (Pidgeon et al. 2010). The analysis is based on 
ordered probit models in STATA. Ordered probit models were chosen as they are ap-
propriate for categorical dependent variables for which other estimation techniques, 
such as Ordinary Least Squares, would offer biased results. A second separate ordered 
probit is then run that examines the effect of political belief as a determinant of con-
cern. The conceptual model tested is that concern for climate change is the key deter-
minant of public willingness to accept policy, and that concern is in turn determined 
by politics. The probit models are represented by the standard equation given in (1), 
where Φ is the normal distribution: 
 (1) 
In the first model the dependent variable, yi, is the likelihood to vote for gov-
ernment policies to implement climate change policies, while the covariate xi is the 
concern for climate change. In the second model the dependent variable yi is the con-
cern regarding climate change, and xi is a set of covariates in the category politics.  
 
 
Evaluating policy stability in UK Climate Change Policy 
This section illustrates the relevance of public opinion and the political system for 
policy stability at the example of UK Climate Change Policy. The 2008 Climate 
Change Act (Lockwood, 2013) and a package of related policies such as the Low 
Carbon Transition Plan 2009 increased ambitions compared to previous policies and 
set out a pathway towards CO2 emission reductions using carbon budgets, command-
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and-control and market-based policy instruments. It established the world’s first 
legally binding national climate mitigation target (Nachmany et al., 2014). Following 
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change with its five-yearly review cycle of national 
climate policies and the objective to decarbonise economies by the end of the century, 
the UK Climate Change Act is likely to be seen as potential policy role-model by 
other developed countries as it provides an early empirical example of relatively 
ambitious climate policy.  
The flagship legislation includes the Green New Deal/ Energy Act 2011 to 
improve energy efficiency in buildings (Booth and Choudhary, 2013), the 2010-
updated building regulations part L on energy efficiency improvements, Supplier 
Obligations/ updated Carbon Emission Reduction Targets, tax breaks for low 
emission vehicles, the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme 2013 and an increased focus 
on renewable energies and Carbon Capture and Storage. The climate policies 
legislated between 2000 and 2013 aim at incentivising low carbon lifestyles. 
 
 
Public opinion: concern about climate change and willingness to accept policies 
There is a generally wide acceptability and support for climate policies among the 
public, including a willingness among the majority to pay for higher electricity bills 
linked to investments in renewable energies and energy efficiency (Pidgeon et al., 
2010). 71 per cent of respondents (strongly) agree that it is their responsibility to help 
do something about climate change. 68 per cent would vote in favour of spending 
taxpayer’s money on British projects designed to tackle climate change, while 65 per 
cent (strongly) agree that they are prepared to greatly reduce their energy use to help 
tackle climate change. 52 per cent are willing to pay up to £10/ $15 more per month 
on their energy bills to ensure that electricity comes primarily from renewable sources 
(Pidgeon et al., 2010).  
The results for the willingness to vote for public action on climate change 
show that increasing concern is positively and significantly related to willingness to 
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take action (Table 1). The scale of the marginal effects can be seen in Table 2. Those 
who are fairly concerned with climate change are 3 per cent more likely to definitely 
vote against policies than those who are very concerned, and 15 per cent less likely to 
definitely vote in favour. Those who are not at all concerned are 21 per cent more 
likely to definitely vote against, and 36 per cent less likely to definitely vote in favour. 
These results highlight that concern plays a crucial role in shaping willingness to take 
public action on climate change.   
 Ordered probit coefficient -  
Public action Q38_4 
Q8_2 – Fairly concerned -0.383*** 
(-6.52) 
(0.00) 
Q8_3 – Not very con-
cerned 
-0.707*** 
(-9.61) 
(0.00) 
Q8_4 – Not at all con-
cerned 
-1.209*** 
(-13.01) 
(0.00) 
Q8_5 – Don’t know -0.344 
(-1.16) 
(0.245) 
Q8_6 – No opinion -0.578 
(-1.50) 
(0.135) 
N 2073 
Pseudo-R2 0.0408 
 
Table 1. Ordered probit coefficients of concern on climate change (Q8) and likeli-
hood to vote in favour of the government spending taxes to address climate change 
(Q38_4) Base question Q8_1 – Very concerned. Compiled by authors.1 
 
Q38_4 
Willingness to 
vote for gov-
ernment spend-
ing taxpayers 
money 
Ordered probit 
marginal effects 
for ‘definitely 
vote against’ 
Ordered probit 
marginal effects 
for ‘probably 
vote against’ 
Ordered probit 
marginal effects 
for ‘probably 
vote in favour’ 
Ordered probit 
marginal effects 
for ‘definitely 
vote in favour’ 
Q8_2 – Fairly 
concerned 
0.034*** 
(6.06) 
(0.00) 
0.061*** 
(6.53) 
(0.00) 
0.050*** 
(5.34) 
(0.00) 
-0.145*** 
(-6.51) 
(0.00) 
Q8_3 – Not very 
concerned 
0.083*** 
(7.14) 
(0.00) 
0.119*** 
(9.12) 
(0.00) 
0.047*** 
(4.71) 
(0.00) 
-0.250*** 
(-10.22) 
(0.00) 
Q8_4 – Not at 0.207*** 0.189*** -0.034 -0.362***                                                         
1 *significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 2.5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. Second 
row shows z-statistics and third row shows p-values. 
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all concerned (8.32) 
(0.00) 
(13.19) 
(0.00) 
(-1.62) 
(0.106) 
(-16.12) 
(0.00) 
Q8_5 – Don’t 
know 
0.029 
(0.89) 
(0.376) 
0.055 
(1.07) 
(0.284) 
0.047** 
(2.00) 
(0.045) 
-0.131 
(-1.23) 
(0.219) 
Q8_6 – No opin-
ion 
0.060 
(1.00) 
(0.319) 
0.096 
(1.40) 
(0.162) 
0.054**** 
(4.34) 
(0.00) 
-0.210 
(-1.72) 
(0.085) 
Table 2. Marginal effects for willingness to vote for government spending taxpayers’ 
money on climate policies and concern about climate change. Base question Q8_1 – 
Very concerned Compiled by authors.  
The second model shows that climate change is not a politically contested 
issue for the British public, i.e. voting decisions are not based on political parties’ 
positions on climate change. Individuals’ political party positions hardly matter for 
their concern for climate change, although Conservative voters do tend to be slightly 
less concerned about climate change compared to Labour supporters as indicated in 
Table 3.  
Q52 How would you vote if there were a General Election tomorrow? 
Base question – Q52 1 Conservatives 
Q52 – 2 Labour -0.224* (-2.38) (0.017) 
Q52 – 3 Liberal Democrat -0.142 (-1.26) (0.207) 
Q52 – 4 Scottish National -0.57 (-0.26) (0.797) 
Q52 – 5 Welsh National  -0.246 (-0.87) (0.386) 
Q52 – 6 Green Party -0.246 (-1.35) (0.177) 
Q52 – 7 Democratic Party -0.606 (-0.71) (0.478) 
Q52 – 8 UKIP 0.035 (0.17) (0.864) 
Q52 – 9 BNP -0.380 (-1.66) (0.097) 
Q52 – 10 Other 0.153 (0.60) (0.549) 
Q52 – 11 Would not vote -0.125 (-1.20) (0.232) 
Q52 – 12 Undecided  -0.145 (-1.76) (0.078) 
Q52 – 13 Refused -0.064 (-0.40) (0.690) 
Table 3. Marginal effects for willingness to vote for political party and concern about 
climate change. Base question Q52_1 – Voting for Conservatives. Compiled by au-
thors.  
 
These findings point towards the opportunity for political consensus among 
the political parties given the low danger of ‘getting punished’ by the electorate for 
ambitious climate policies (or the lack thereof). Politicians can win those voter groups 
who are generally concerned about the environment and climate change. Conservative 
voters however tend to be less concerned about climate change with climate sceptic 
views on the rise compared to Labour supporters (Pidgeon et al., 2010). 
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Figure 1: Concern for climate change in the UK 2008-2013 Source: Eurobarometer. 
In order to understand how concern has evolved in the UK, the results of the 
Eurobarometer survey which included questions on the concern for climate change in 
five separate surveys between 2008 and 2013 are examined.2 The Eurobarometer sur-
veys were established in 1973 and consist of surveys of approximately 1000 face-to-
face interviews per member country on a wide variety of topics. The question asked 
of participants was: 
‘And how serious a problem do you think climate change is at this moment? 
Please use a scale from 1 to 10, where '1' would mean that it is "not at all a seri-
ous problem" and '10' would mean that it is “an extremely serious problem"3’ 
The question was asked in the Eurobarometer surveys of March-May 2008, 
January-February 2009, August-September 2009, June 2011 and November-
December 2013. From Figure 1 it can be seen that the average level of concern in the 
UK has fallen sharply since the first survey was undertaken in 2008, falling almost a 
whole mark from an average approaching to 7 in early 2008, to one just above 6 in 
late 2013. This decline in concern matches other findings for the EU as a whole                                                         
2 The surveys and data are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm. 
3 The question used is identical in all of the surveys used in the dataset with the exception that in the 
2008 survey the words ‘global warming’ were used instead of climate change. 
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(Scruggs and Benegal, 2013) and for the UK in particular (Lockwood, 2013). This 
decline in concern was not associated with any significant reductions in the strength 
of UK policy in this time-period to either the overall policy framework in the shape of 
the Climate Change Act or its associated carbon budgets, or to the many policies that 
make up the UK’s specific climate policy such as the 2010/11 Energy Acts and the 
Climate Change Levy. The finding of a strong concern for climate change in 2008, 
followed by the introduction of the Climate Change Act in 2009, coupled with the 
finding of a strong correlation between public concern and desire for public action in 
2010, help to support the contention that strong public opinion is a necessary pre-
condition for implementing path-dependent climate policy. The finding that the sharp 
decline in concern was not associated with rolling-back of this policy by 2013 could 
potentially indicate that the policy framework implemented in the UK was sufficiently 
locked-in to survive the down-turn in public concern. An alternative explanation is 
that the down-turn in public concern did not affect the ability to implement policy, 
although the findings of the first model that public concern was a significant driver of 
the public’s willingness for the government to take action would dispute this, unless 
government’s ability to implement policy was unrelated to the public’s willingness for 
the government to take action.  
 
The relevance of the political system for policy stability  
A number of conditions emerge for policy stability in UK climate policy design 
relating to the structure of the political system itself. Lock-in, i.e. the immediate 
irreversibility of policies, is difficult to achieve, as there is no guarantee that the 
policy will remain following the next general election. Carrying on Labour-induced 
climate policies to be implemented by the Conservatives required a cross-party 
consensus on ambitious climate policies, which was facilitated by two factors. None 
of the parties framed climate policy as a contentious issue in the general election and 
thus gave voters options to choose between weak or strong climate policies. Instead, 
both parties presented themselves as committed to climate mitigation (Carter and 
Jacobs, 2014). This can be understood as a strategy of managing the risk from getting 
punished for policy choices in the next election (Bertelli and John, 2014).  
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Our findings complement Carter and Jacobs’ (2014) findings regarding the 
importance of a party-political consensus for policy stability within the Westminster 
political system. Levin et al. (2012) argued that the immediate irreversibility of 
policies could be achieved via high democratic barriers such as consensus voting. 
This illustrates the relevance of the political system and its institutional barriers for 
passing and reversing legislation. Particularly the presidential system in the US with 
its requirements to pass global climate change treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol 
through the Senate and House of Representatives with differing political majorities 
under a strict separation of powers (Bell, 2004) proved a major stumbling block to 
global action on mitigating climate change in the case of the Kyoto Protocol. In 
contrast, parliamentary systems such as the UK with their more fluid power sharing 
between legislature and executive facilitate the emergence of policies given a party 
majority – yet these policies have fewer ‘protective hurdles’ to take if the opposition 
gains power following the next election and decides to dismantle these policies. 
Furthermore, the election campaign may have been unrelated to climate policy, 
making policy uncertainty a matter of ‘collateral damage’ beyond public opinion and 
democratic demands. This, in turn, influences strategic voting behaviour among 
voters deeply concerned about climate change (Kedar, 2011). In addition, the electoral 
system may also exert influence on the level of policy stability attainable, such as the 
differences between the UK ‘first-past-the-post’ winner takes it all versus a 
proportional representation system where the preferences of minority voters are 
represented more accurately such as in Germany (Vowles, 2004). In the ‘public 
mood’, there was no clear-cut link between political preferences and climate change 
concern, pushing voters with green beliefs and climate concern to one particular party. 
Consequently, policies with the potential for lock-in must be framed within a non-
contentious, non-confrontational party political consensus.  
In the case of climate policy in parliamentary systems such as the UK, 
Germany or in particular smaller EU member states, being embedded into the 
complex legislative structures within the EU provides a limited backstop if coupled 
with the danger of ‘losing face’ through too many policy U-turns and violation of 
previous commitments. Certain parallels could be drawn to Spilker’s (2011) argument 
on the reputational stakes that influence the compliance of developing countries with 
environmental standards based on their institutionalised membership in 
intergovernmental organisations. This points towards the additional relevance of 
 18 
supra- and international decision-making forums for national policy formulation with 
a higher likelihood of consensual decision-making such as in the UNFCCC.  
Strong embeddedness in multilevel governance plays a crucial role for 
achieving and strengthening policy stability considering that climate change affects 
multiple governance levels ranging from the local via the national and transnational to 
the global level (Markantoni, 2016; Paavola, 2016; Smedby and Quitzau, 2016). 
Outcomes on the level of the global climate change negotiations within the UNFCCC 
are very difficult to achieve given the requirement of unamity among 196+ countries. 
Yet, once adopted, the 2015 Paris Agreement provides a very strong signal to 
countries, industries and the investment community that economic growth in the 21st 
century will be based on decarbonisation and decoupling of GHG emissions from 
economic activity. This in turn reassures UK-based actors of the importance of the 
2008 Climate Change Act to remain in place and deters future governments from 
going against global commitments (criterion 1 by Levin et al., 2012). Reassurances 
for the business community and inherent pay-offs from investments particularly in the 
areas of energy efficiency and cost-competitive renewable energies can be seen as one 
option to achieve criteria 2, 3 and 4 for stable policies suggested by Levin et al. 
(2012) as being self-reinforcing with increasing returns and positive feedback. The 
Carbon Budget provides a good overall objective while remaining flexible on how 
exactly the targets are achieved, thus also allowing for minor adjustments over time 
(criterion 5 on adaptability within policy pathways).  
The findings on voter support and party-political positions on climate change 
are interesting if considering how the 2008 UK Climate Change Act emerged. A 
campaign by Friends of the Earth in 2005 provided an external push of climate 
change onto the British political agenda. It was the Conservatives under the leadership 
of David Cameron who pushed for a British climate policy: David Cameron used 
climate change as a new issue on the agenda to rebrand his party with a view to the 
2010 election and thus to end 13 years in opposition. Cameron’s calls for a climate 
change bill coincided with Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs David Milliband’s push for climate mitigation in the UK and his support for a 
30 per cent GHG emission reduction target of the EU (by 2020 from 1990) instead of 
only 20 per cent. In addition, an alliance of businesses also asked for robust climate 
policies to allow for reliable investments in renewable energy infrastructure (Carter 
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and Jacobs, 2014). These external pushes from the business community and the issue 
competition from the Conservatives resulted in reduced opposition within the Labour 
parties’ ranks. Consequently, UK climate policies became possible due to inter-party 
competition. Both departed from the ‘play it safe and do little’ consensus of the early 
2000s (Carter, 2006). It was also facilitated by the non-politisation of climate change 
and in particular the emerging cross-party political consensus to plan, legislate and 
implement climate change policies even after the opposition party took power 
following the general election in 2010 (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). 
 
 
 
Discussion  
 
British climate policy to date only displays some characteristics of the level of path-
dependency required to achieve policy stability while maintaining ambitious climate 
mitigation objectives. The key pitfall is the simple reversibility within the 
Westminster parliamentary political system based on a political parties’ majority. 
Policies can be relatively easily reversed given the absence of constitutional 
provisions or consensus voting (Levin et al., 2012). Thus, the lock-in effect (criterion 
1 for policy stability) remains fairly weak within the UK. There are however a 
number of safeguards that strengthen policy stability. First, the 2008 UK Climate 
Change Act is set up as a legally binding commitment, sending a strong signal to 
future governments that it is intended to serve as the UK’s climate flagship policy 
well into the 2040s, allowing for strengthening of the commitments, but discouraging 
a weakening of the climate targets. The time period between 2008 and 2016 has 
already resulted in increasingly powerful vested interests in the form of clean 
industries benefitting from the regulatory framework and lobbying for its continued 
stringency (criterion 2 is thus partly fulfilled). Secondly, its firm embeddedness into 
the European climate strategy (at least for the first decade) and international 
mitigation targets via the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the recent 2015 Paris 
Agreement however offer the basis for lock-in effects (alternative mechanisms for 
criterion 1). The carbon budgets provide a certain reliability for the business 
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community to make investments in line with the planned CO2 emission reductions, 
resulting in increasing returns over time as renewable energies improve their cost-
competitiveness (criterion 3 fulfilled). The key aspect are vested interests. As an 
increasing number of industries and employees benefit from the clean technologies 
and new markets of the ‘sharing economy’, the support expands to other populations 
beyond the initial target population (criterion 4 fulfilled). The yet undefined carbon 
budgets towards 2050 allow for adaptability within the pathway to a low carbon 
economy, in particular in terms of choosing policy instruments appropriate to the 
economic situation and technological advances (criterion 5 fulfilled), while allowing 
flexibility on the policy instruments used to achieve the targets.  
Yet, a note of caution is important. First, there is no guarantee that decisions 
taken by a new government and the re-evaluation of policies in the wake of Brexit 
will not reverse or abandon current government policy. Second, in the Westminster 
parliamentary system, lock-in, and with it stable climate policy, requires a stable 
cross-party political consensus, as otherwise the risk remains that one government’s 
climate policy is reversed once the opposition party takes over following the next 
general election. Changes to policies are however costly and require short-term wins 
for those reversing the policies such as the expectation of winning climate sceptic 
voters versus losing fewer voters with green preferences. This in turn requires the 
basic assumption that political party positions on climate change influence voting 
behaviour in the first place. Furthermore, public opinion strongly discounts future 
benefits as opposed to up-front costs. This means that stable policies should start with 
low ambitions and be adaptable towards higher ambitions over time, which need to be 
in line with the future benefits for the public and tax payer. The findings indicate that 
there is a benefit in stable policies with a path-dependency element as these allow to 
align initial low costs–low benefits with later higher costs (from more ambitious 
policies) and higher benefits. They thus break the time-lag of low political 
acceptability, which is linked to initially ambitious (and costly) policies. 
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Conclusion 
 
Key challenges of ‘super-wicked’ problems such as climate change call for ambitious 
policies within stable policy frameworks to be effective. Policy stability requires lock-
in into a low-carbon economic development trajectory, support from the initial target 
population that extends to other populations, needs to be self-reinforcing with costs 
for reversal rising over time while benefits from the policy increase (Levin et al., 
2012). There is also a need for adaptability within an overall low-carbon economic 
development trajectory as new scientific evidence calls for adjustments. To this end, 
this contribution analysed the framework conditions for stable policies to emerge and 
remain in place by focusing on the relevance of the political system and public 
opinion at the example of UK Climate Change Policy. 
The UK Climate Change Act 2008 can be considered as a weakly stable policy 
that meets elements of the path-dependency criteria set out by Levin et al. (2012), in 
particular via the long-term objective to reduce over 80 per cent of GHG by 2050 and 
the specified carbon budgets set into legally binding form. The Westminster 
parliamentary political system however remains vulnerable to major policy shifts and 
resulting investment instabilities once general elections empower the political 
opposition or government changes due to the resignation of the Prime Minister. These 
cases occurred in the UK in 2010, 2015 and 2016. This illustrates the importance of 
cross-party political consensus to lend policy stability. In 2010, the Conservative/ 
Liberal Democrat government implemented the Labour-designed Climate Change Act 
2008 and agreed on the fourth carbon budget. Until the UK leaves the EU and 
depending on the negotiations on the future relationship of UK and EU climate policy 
(and, by extension, the future of the UK Climate Change Act), UK climate policy 
remains deeply embedded into the EU climate policy package on renewable energies, 
energy efficiency and the European Emission Trading Scheme. Yet, also outside the 
EU, the UK made strong commitments under the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol Phase II 
(2012-2020) and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The findings of the Eurobarometer public 
opinion surveys on climate change carried out between 2010 and 2013 indicate 
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considerably high (though declining from 6.4 to 6.2, table 3) public concern and 
support for climate change policies, including a willingness to pay and to spend 
taxpayer’s money. Yet, there is a trend towards declining concern on climate change 
in the UK with a rise of climate scepticism, in particular among voters supporting the 
Conservative Party. Together with the power shift in the Conservative Party, the re-
shuffling of the Department of Energy and Climate Change into the Department of 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, 
policy stability is being weakened. It remains to be seen if the 2015 Paris Agreement, 
a growing lobbying power of the clean tech industry and green investors as well as the 
legally binding character of the carbon budgets provide sufficient policy stability for 
UK climate change policy to prevail.  
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